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ABSTRACT: This article identifies the value of insurgent defectors
fighting within counterinsurgencies to offset weaknesses within the
effort and to act as a force multiplier, as long as the counterinsurgent
meets defectors’ shared interests with the government.

W

ith internal conflict comes the question of what to do with
insurgent defectors. In Afghanistan, international actors and
the Afghan government have been intermittently attempting
to reconcile with, or rehabilitate, members of the insurgency. These
efforts have included incorporating defectors into the security forces.1
In Iraq, the government faces major questions about how to handle
Sunnis who fought for the Islamic State and then changed sides. In
Syria, the alignments and realignments of state and nonstate actors have
been dizzying.
As the United States continues supporting other weak, failed,
and unstable states, the question of how to use defectors to achieve
operational goals remains prominent. Furthermore, as the international
community continues efforts to end internal conflicts and integrate
insurgent fighters into national armies, larger questions about assuring
peace after conflict also arise.2
This article analyzes the conditions in which counterinsurgencies
have most effectively used guerrilla defectors in their fighting forces.
Systematic analysis of the Algerian War (1954–62), the insurgency in
Oman (1965–76), the Rhodesian Bush War (1964–79), the civil war
in El Salvador (1979–92), and US operations in Iraq (2003–present)
provide variations in operational and strategic outcomes, types of
counterinsurgencies and insurgencies, and historical contexts to identify
lessons applicable to other campaigns. The lessons learned emphasize
the importance of using defectors for their unique skills and for assuring
a long-term, post-conflict alignment of political interests between
defectors and counterinsurgents.
The exploitation of defectors lends support to the argument that
counterinsurgency is essentially a political struggle, rather than strictly
a military one, and thus political measures taken by counterinsurgents

1      A number of Taliban defectors have been integrated into local security forces in the Afghan
Local Police program, for example, but remain in their own communities. Kevin Baron, “Reintegrated
Taliban Fighters Allowed To Join Local Police Units,” Stars and Stripes, January 4, 2011.
2      Ronald R. Krebs and Roy Licklider, “United They Fall: Why the International Community
Should Not Promote Military Integration after Civil War,” International Security 40, no. 3 (Winter
2015/2016): 93–138, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00228.
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strongly influence who wins and who loses.3 A counterinsurgent’s ability
to attract elements of the insurgency suggests a broader ability to make
choices that will weaken the political and military challenges posed by
insurgents. Conversely, a counterinsurgency unable, or unwilling, to
provide political accommodations to gain the cooperation of those it
has fought against is unlikely to have the political capabilities necessary
to defeat the insurgency.
Attempts to draw insurgents away from their causes are common in
counterinsurgency campaigns. Discussions of the use of defectors, such
as in pseudo gangs that infiltrate an insurgency, do appear in existing
work on counterinsurgency.4 Using them as fighters is apparently
less common, but there is little research available on this aspect of
counterinsurgency.5 The use of defectors as fighters does not necessarily
win wars, but under certain conditions it can advance political and
military counterinsurgency goals because defectors can act as force
multipliers. Many other questions about defectors are not addressed
here, but are worthy of investigation.

Advancing Counterinsurgent Goals

Counterinsurgencies can reap substantial benefits by using defectors
as fighters to overcome innate areas of weakness such as local knowledge
and irregular fighting ability.6 Defectors can provide operational
and strategic information on the insurgency’s leadership, members,
operations, communications, caches, and support systems; the civilian
population, leaders, and groups including their languages, cultures,
interests, demands, and frustrations; as well as other conditions such
as terrain and weather. Defectors can provide irregular warfare skills to
conventionally trained armies and to armies whose primary role has been
regime protection rather than fighting ability.7 Additionally, defectors
can, on behalf of counterinsurgents, exchange information with other
actors in the conflict, the insurgency, and the populace. Troops from
other areas of the country or foreign forces may not have this ability.
Many, if not all, insurgencies conduct a degree of irregular warfare,
which equips insurgents with greater irregular warfighting skills than
the average soldier in a conventional army.
3      Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1966); David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1964, 2006); and United States Department of the Army, The U.S. Army/
Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: U.S. Army Field Manual no. 3-24: Marine Corps Warfighting
Publication no. 3-33.5 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
4      Stephen T. Hosmer and Sibylle O. Crane, Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, April 16–20, 1962
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1962); the work of Frank Kitson; Ian F. W. Beckett, “The
Rhodesian Army: Counter-Insurgency, 1972–1979,” part 2, Selous Scouts, September 16, 2007,
http://selousscouts.tripod.com/rhodesian%20army%20coin%2072_79%20part2.htm; Lawrence
E. Cline, Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency: Lessons From Other Countries (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, 2005); and Robert M. Cassidy, “The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for
Counterinsurgency,” Parameters 36, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 47–62.
5      Valuable literature on militias as state proxies is developing, but it does not focus on defectors.
6      For more on the degree to which states can understand communities within their borders,
see James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). The Department of Defense (DoD) defines irregular
warfare as “a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the
relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full
range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”
DoD, Irregular Warfare (IW,) Joint Operating Concept (JOC), Version 1.0 (Washington: DoD, 2007).
7      Caitlin Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2015).
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Counterinsurgencies that take advantage of an insurgent’s unique
skill set are likely to benefit more than those that merge insurgents
into regular forces. Effective use of defectors’ knowledge and irregular
fighting abilities requires matching their unit assignments with their
unique skills and giving them a voice in designing operations they
will participate in, which also takes advantage of their high levels of
self-confidence. This factor ties into the need to work according to the
interests of the defectors and the counterinsurgency. Research finds an
increased sense of agency plays a role in individual decisions to become
an insurgent.8 Logically, ex-insurgents would want to retain that sense of
controlling their own destiny in their new roles. Their local knowledge
probably means they have greater insight into the likely political effects
of counterinsurgent choices than government or intervening forces.
Acceptance and cooperation from regular forces is another factor
that contributes to the successful use of defectors. If conventional
forces refuse to cooperate with defectors’ efforts, the defectors’
presence and actions are not force multipliers but sources of division
and resentment within the counterinsurgent force. Defector units must
also be consistently trained and supported to do what they do best,
which is typically small-unit operations such as ambushing, tracking,
and intelligence collection.
For defectors to remain on the counterinsurgency’s side, they must
identify their own interests with the counterinsurgency’s success and
believe their benefits will continue beyond the conflict’s end. Such
interests may range from revenge or personal gain to a desire to be on
the winning side. Any individual defector’s interests are likely to include
a variety of short- and long-term motivations comprised under the rubric
of identifying with the goal of counterinsurgent success. Defectors
are more likely to remain with the counterinsurgency if they left the
insurgency because their interests began to align more closely to those
of the counterinsurgency than defectors motivated by weariness, fear,
or financial gain. This tendency occurs because insurgents, in taking up
arms, reveal their focus on the future and their belief in their ability to
shape it.9

Research Design

The cases examined here were drawn from counterinsurgency
campaigns in which a great power backed a client threatened by an
insurgency. Also for policy relevance, these cases include various degrees
of great power intervention, from occupation by tens of thousands of
combat troops to a small footprint of military advisors. All cases involve
an insurgency fueled at least in part by nationalism.
Some may argue wars for national liberation are an artifact of the
post-World War II breakdown of the colonial order, and thus have
limited relevance in the postcolonial world. However, contemporary
cases of resistance to occupation are similar to anticolonial wars in
the desire of the insurgents, and their civilian supporters, to reduce
8      Scott, Seeing Like a State; DoD, Irregular Warfare; and Talmadge, Dictator’s Army.
9      This focus on the long-term alignment of interests between counterinsurgent and defector
is similar to advice for all sorts of alliances and long-term partnerships, from marriages to business
arrangements to military interactions with other types of actors.
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the influence of the great power backing their government.10 Finally,
cases of counterinsurgency success and failure assist in determining
whether the variables important for the effective use of defectors differ
according to campaign outcomes.11 These variables are, first, how
the counterinsurgency uses defectors as fighters, and second, to what
degree the counterinsurgency assures defectors’ interests. Defectors
who use their unique skills and who expect postwar benefits from
counterinsurgent success are likely to be more effective in advancing
the counterinsurgency’s effort.
Algerian War: Counterinsurgency failure. During the revolutionary war
for national liberation, Algerian insurgents drove the French from
power in what France considered its territory. The insurgents sought
equal rights with and eventually gained independence from the French.
Insurgency in Oman: Counterinsurgency success. The Sultan of Oman and
his British backers countered a broad-based nationalist and Marxist
insurgency in Dhofar, Oman’s southernmost region. Insurgents seeking
greater independence from Britain, and a social and political revolution,
were decisively defeated in the military campaign.
Rhodesian Bush War: Counterinsurgency failure. Black nationalist
insurgents defeated the minority white government in the former British
colony now known as Zimbabwe.
El Salvador’s civil war: Counterinsurgency success. A broad-based
revolutionary insurgency fought to end US domination of the state
and the region and to end military rule. The US-backed incumbent
government remained in power after the peace agreement, but the
military was no longer in control.
US operations in Iraq: Continuing counterinsurgency. After the United
States invaded Iraq in 2003, it toppled the government. Broad-based
insurgencies have fought the US occupation, Sunnis and Shiites waged
civil war, and terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State,
battled for power.

Analysis
Special Skills

Evidence from the civil war in El Salvador and US operations in
Iraq shows the most value is gained when defectors’ strengths offset a
counterinsurgency’s weakness. The evidence from Rhodesia indicates
a lack of attention to defector units’ strengths and weaknesses can
have political costs for the counterinsurgency. To take advantage of
unique skills—such as intelligence and irregular fighting ability as
well as knowledge of the terrain, languages, cultures, population, and
insurgency—counterinsurgents conduct a full assessment of the situation
to take advantage of unique skills, such as intelligence, irregular fighting

10      Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random
House, 2005).
11      Steven Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1997), 21–27.
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ability. If the conflict involves ethnicity, for example, coethnic defectors
are more likely to be effective than cross-ethnic ones.12
In Dhofar, the Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF) exploited the fighting
ability of the firqats, or militias, formed around defectors with tribal
connections and local knowledge. The firqats knew the ground and
guerrilla tactics; they were good at what the British officers and the other
troops, from such locations as Northern Oman and Pakistan, were bad
at—including reconnaissance, speed of maneuver, and recognizing trails
and individuals in the mountains, where the insurgency was strongest.
The firqats were also better at intelligence collection and, unsurprisingly,
at communicating with other Dhofaris.13 Lacking military discipline,
the firqats patrolled and ambushed in small groups, and held tribal
territory that had been taken in conventional joint operations with the
Sultan’s Armed Forces.14 The firqats were reliable skirmishers against
small numbers of insurgents. But their lack of discipline and refusal
to conduct operations were not of direct benefit to their exasperated
regular SAF officers.15
The firqats were a force multiplier by virtue of the ethnicity they
shared with much of the mountain population: the counterinsurgency’s
use of the coethnic force in these regions was less likely to spark resistance
than punitive operations conducted by non-Dhofari troops. Brigadier
John Graham ordered the Dhofar Brigade to continue punishing
Dhofaris who helped the enemy, using the firqats whenever possible.16
The firqats also made the Sultan’s counterinsurgent force look less like
an army of occupation. The insurgents reportedly considered one firqat
a greater danger than 10 of the Sultan’s regular troops.17
The firqats were a rich source of information.18 During Operation
Husn, the Omani force used firqats to identify individuals trying
to leave the area.19 The defectors were also able to identify insurgent
leaders and supporters, round them up, and encourage them to
repudiate the insurgency publicly.20 The firqats made it possible for the
counterinsurgency to clear insurgents out of the valleys of eastern and
central Dhofar at relatively low cost. Searching the deep, jungled, caveriddled depths required examining every square yard for insurgent arms
12      Jason Lyall, “Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second
Chechen War,” American Political Science Review 104, no. 1 (February 2010): 1–20, doi:10.1017
/S0003055409990323.
13      Ian Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan: A First Hand Account of the Dhofar Insurgency (Barnsley,
South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Military, 2007), 159; Tony Jeapes, SAS: Operation Oman (London:
William Kimber, 1983), 231; and John Akehurst, We Won a War: The Campaign in Oman 1965–1975
(Wilton, UK: Michael Russell, 1982), 96.
14      Jeapes, SAS, 123.
15      MG Tony Jeapes, (former commander of 22nd Special Air Regiment during the Dhofar
Rebellion), interview with author, May 15, 2009; and Gardiner, Service of the Sultan, 157.
16      Directive for Commander Dhofar for 1972 Update, March 3, 1972, John Graham Collection,
Oman Archive (OA), GB165-0327, Box 2, Folder 3, Middle East Center (MEC), St. Antony’s College
(SAC), Oxford University, UK.
17      Operation Storm Fortnightly Report, May 5, 1971, Graham, OA, GB165-0327, Box 2, Folder
5, MEC, SAC, Oxford.
18      Interview recording, Brigadier John Bryan Akehurst (commander, Dhofar Brigade, 1974–
1976), October 14, 1992, catalog number 11156, reel 2, Imperial War Museum (IWM); and Jeapes,
interview.
19      Ops/2 Confirmatory Notes: Operation Husn, April 7, 1975, Edward Ashley Collection, OA,
GB165-0399, Box 2, Folder 2/3, MEC, SAC, Oxford.
20      Jeapes, SAS, 64–65.
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and supply caches. The Sultan’s troops stayed in the heights while the
firqats and their Special Air Service (SAS) advisors cleared the valleys.
The firqats’ demeanor indicated how dangerous each area was. The
firqats also talked with the populace and returned with the location of
caches. Blind searching in the valleys was a wasted effort.21
In El Salvador, US advisors experimented with the use of defectors’
skills in the field. Some of the success of defector units in El Salvador was
due to support by experienced, individual US Special Forces advisors who
had worked with other non-US troops and in other conflicts involving
irregular warfare.22 In one area, defectors were used in a role similar
to that of a pseudo gang, but they did not masquerade. The defectors,
led by a former insurgent platoon leader, made up the most successful
unit in the 5th Brigade Zone in 1985–86, which once accounted for the
majority of kills in the entire brigade. The unit walked into insurgent
bases and killed or captured everyone present, with Salvadoran special
forces support.23
US advisors in El Salvador also used defectors to identify other
insurgents. In the 4th Brigade Zone in 1989–90, US advisors made a
practice of hiding a defector inside a truck with a hole cut in the canvas
so he could see the villagers who lined up to accept rice, oil, beans, and
other foodstuffs delivered in civic action projects. Anyone the defector
identified could either be quietly picked up outside town or followed
in hopes of finding an insurgent camp.24 Defectors also provided the
insurgency’s communications codes, a great prize given the insurgency’s
highly effective operational security.25
During US operations in Iraq, tribal forces in Anbar turned against
al-Qaeda to side with the US military and joined the Iraqi army and police
while conducting their own operations to raid insurgent caches and safe
houses.26 These independent operations benefited the counterinsurgency
at relatively little cost.
In contrast, the Rhodesian counterinsurgents learned the costs of
using defector units, such as the Selous Scouts, for operations that played
only to their tactical strengths. The Scouts served not only as pseudo
gangs but also as trackers, guides, and hunter-killer teams.27 These
defectors significantly increased the intelligence the counterinsurgency
received through their long-range reconnaissance and surveillance

21      Jeapes, interview.
22      MG Mark Hamilton (USA Retired) (US military group leader in San Salvador during peace
talks), interview with author, April 13, 2010.
23      COL Francisco Pedrozo (USA Retired) (trained first group of Salvadoran cadets at Fort
Benning, GA, in 1982; military advisor in San Vicente 1985–86; and training officer, operations
advisor, deputy commander of the U.S. military group in San Salvador 1989–92), email messages
to author, April 4, 2010. US-advised forces in the Philippines used similar ruses against the Huks.
24      MG Simeon Trombitas (USA Retired) (senior advisor/chief of operations, planning and
training with the 4th Infantry Brigade in Chalatenango, El Salvador, 1989–90), email message to
author, April 4, 2010.
25      CSM Henry Ramirez (USA Retired) (trainer of Salvadoran forces in Panama in 1982,
including the first long range reconnaissance patrol unit in 1982–83, and a military advisor in
Chalatenango 1987–88), interview with author, May 17, 2010.
26      MAJ Niel Smith and COL Sean MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point,” Military
Review 88, no. 2 (March–April 2008): 41–52; and, Akehurst, catalog number 11156, reel 2, IWM.
27      Beckett, “Rhodesian Army.”
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missions. One study credits the Scouts with 68 percent of all insurgent
kills inside Rhodesia.28
However, these defectors also pushed operations into neighboring
states, including mounting assassination attempts and large operations
that hurt the Rhodesian government politically. One egregious case
involved a raid in which unarmed guerrillas were shot as they stood
in a parade formation and all the patients in the camp hospital were
burned alive when Scout fire set the structure alight. The attack drew
international condemnation, which was intensified by the fact that the
camp was a registered UN refugee center.29
The Scouts had the material capability to launch these external
operations but lacked the strategic understanding to recognize the
political implications of their warfighting choices. In addition, their
background and training meant they were not particularly concerned
with the state-to-state relations important to Rhodesia. The Scouts
focused on destroying the insurgency militarily.

Enfranchised Roles, Targeting, and Operations

Evidence from Algeria and Dhofar supports the finding that
defectors are more likely to serve counterinsurgent purposes when they
provide input into their roles, targeting, and operational planning. In
Algeria, the French formed a force of Harkis, who were Arab, Berber,
or Muslim Algerian soldiers rather than French or French Algerian
soldiers, made up of about 1,000 insurgent defectors, keeping each unit
near its home community. The Harkis, reluctant to fight elsewhere due to
fear for their families’ safety, were more effective at hunting insurgents
because they knew the operational areas well.30 Similarly, in al-Anbar
province, the US Army found former insurgents were more likely to join
the Iraqi army if they were assigned to their home area.31 In Dhofar, the
firqats’ insistence on seemingly endless talking over operational plans
maddened the British regular officers, but commanders considered it
was worth the cost because of the military and political gains enabled
by the defectors.32

Organize, Train, and Support

In Dhofar, El Salvador, and Iraq, the counterinsurgencies benefited
by organizing, training, and fully supporting defectors’ operations. The
French failure to do so in Algeria had high costs.
In Dhofar, the SAS began with a determination that units of
defectors would not be used simply as guides; they would be fighters,
properly armed, trained, and supported.33 The SAS trained the firqats
in fire discipline, patrol formations, tactics, and maneuver, as well as
operating as units with machine gun, mortar, artillery, and air support.34
Extending the SAS role from training to accompanying the firqats in
28      Cline, Pseudo Operations, 13.
29      Cline, Pseudo Operations, 12.
30      Cassidy, “Long Small War.”
31      Smith and MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens.”
32      Gardiner, Service of the Sultan, 157; and MG Ken Perkins (commander of the SAF 1975–77),
interview with author, May 20, 2009.
33      Jeapes, SAS, 48.
34      Jeapes, email message to author, September 11, 2009.
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the field made backing them with direct and indirect fires and air power
possible. This presence also reduced high-level concerns about the
possibility of the firqats returning to the other side, though at a cost.35
The SAS men working with the firqats suffered a casualty rate as high
as 30 percent.36
Local forces in Dhofar who were untrained, poorly armed, and
unsupported were less reliable. Most could stand guard and little more.
Some passed information to the insurgents.37 The Oman Gendarmerie,
who were guarding the fort at Mirbat when insurgents mounted an attack
in July 1972, declined to assist the small number of SAS troops and other
defenders repelling the onslaught.38 In Algeria, the Harkis grew from 18
to 385 village forces, totaling about 60,000 fighters. Their effectiveness,
however, varied significantly with the abilities of the French officers
assigned as area administrators and responsible for training.39
Individual advisors in El Salvador created effective units in their
area of operations even with limited institutional support. One highly
effective unit of defectors was set up quietly, outside US Embassy
oversight, and the troops were paid with Central Intelligence Agency
money.40 This unit was supported by the best troops the US advisors
could find and train, Salvadoran special forces noncommissioned
officers, who also ran the operations. The men got special uniforms and
pay and were exempt from routine duties. The CIA provided a bounty
for captured weapons that could be traced to the insurgency.41
Similarly, efforts to use the local militias, known as Awakening
Councils, against al-Qaeda in Baghdad, Iraq, were more effective when
US troops not only worked closely with militia commanders but also
when operations included militias, Iraqi army troops, and US soldiers
together. Complaints about Iraqi and militia intimidation of civilians
and criminal behavior dropped significantly under these conditions,
a positive indicator as the United States sought popular support for
the counterinsurgency.42
Military support for the Iraqi militias was also important in increasing
their effectiveness. When residents of the Baghdad neighborhood of
Amiriyah decided to challenge al-Qaeda, they faced a hard fight. The
Americans held their fire against the militia when it initiated action and
later sent in two Stryker platoons to stop the insurgents’ advance against
the militia members hard-pressed in their strongholds.43 On an earlier
occasion, US forces quickly blocked an al-Qaeda attack on a tribe in
Anbar that had begun challenging its control the area.44 These US choices
35      Jeapes, SAS, 48.
36      Jeapes, interview. For context, the casualty rate for British Commonwealth troops in World
War II was nearly 11 percent. Thomas Harding and Graeme Wilson, “Afghan Casualty Rate ‘at Level
of Last War,’ ” Telegraph, July 16, 2007.
37      Captured Enemy Documents—Third National Congress of Rakyut June 1971, December
15, 1971, Graham, OA Box 2, Folder 5, MEC, SAC, Oxford.
38      Interview recording, anonymous, October 23, 1992, catalog number 11161, reel 1, IMW.
39      Cassidy, “Long Small War.”
40      Pedrozo, emails.
41      Ibid.
42      LTC Dale Kuehl, “Testing Galula in Ameriyah: The People Are the Key,” Military Review 89,
no. 2 (March–April 2009): 72–80.
43      Kuehl, “Testing Galula.”
44      Smith and MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens.”
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prevented the slaughter of new allies and demonstrated commitment
and a willingness to bear the costs of keeping the partnership.
US forces in Iraq also found that paying, equipping, and training
tribal forces was worth the cost. Recruits accepted for training in the
Iraqi police received a payment, and officers who stayed with the police
force for more than three months received a bonus. Training included
urban combat to build the coalition’s small-unit effectiveness.45 Violence
dropped significantly in Anbar once US forces reached a modus vivendi
with the tribes.46

Cooperation within Conventional Forces

In Dhofar and Iraq, defectors were better able to support insurgent
goals when main force troops and officers recognized the value of their
efforts and demonstrated a willingness to cooperate operationally.
Evidence from Algeria, Rhodesia, and El Salvador is insufficient for
affirming a lack of coordination and distrust between irregular and
regular units can lead to bad outcomes such as friendly fire episodes.47
The campaign in Dhofar was based on more extensive use of the
firqats. The strategy was to fight for and hold territory in the eastern
sector of Dhofar and then the central area. The counterinsurgency
targeted areas of weaker support for the insurgency, held the territory,
and eventually pushed insurgents into the more thinly populated west
to destroy them adjacent to their safe haven in Yemen. The firqats were
integral to the plan. They scouted and skirmished, gained targeting
information from friends and family in their home areas, helped the
Sultan’s army take new territory, and then held it with the SAS.
The firqats routinely coordinated with the counterinsurgents in
operations from clearing to eliminating insurgent mortar positions and
searching for arms caches.48 The regular officers found trusting the
firqats difficult, and the risk of friendly fire was high because the firqats
looked and dressed like the insurgents.49 But, when the SAF shunned
the defectors, operations were less successful. Near the end of the war,
one regimental commander refused to work with firqats. Without their
intelligence, he could not locate the last remaining insurgents in the
cleared eastern area. The SAS was reassigned to the area, reestablished
its relationship with the firqats, and began getting the information the
Sultan’s Armed Forces needed to remove the remaining insurgents.50
The SAF complained that the firqats were in touch with the enemy,
but that was part of the point: the firqats were getting information and
trying to win over more defectors.51 The militias were also unpredictable,
and thus frustrating, to regular forces accustomed to orderly, hierarchical
behavior. The defectors were eager to attack, would jump into a flurry
45      Ibid.
46      Austin Long, “The Anbar Awakening,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 50, no. 2 (April-May
2008): 67–94, doi:10.1080/00396330802034283.
47      Gardiner, Service of the Sultan, 157; and Perkins, interview.
48      Gardiner, Service of the Sultan, 140–41; “Notes on Visit to Oman,” COL W. J. Reed, Ministry
of Defence DEFE 25/312, The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA), Kew, UK;
Akehurst, We Won a War, 77; and Jeapes, SAS 190–91.
49      Gardiner, Service of the Sultan, 157; and Perkins, interview.
50      Jeapes, interview.
51      Jeapes, SAS, 76.
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of activity to arrange an operation, then change their minds.52 But, the
SAS, with a background in working with non-European troops and in
irregular warfare could recognize the firqats’ strengths and be patient,
as well as interface with the SAF to facilitate cooperation.53
In Iraq, the United States was also apprehensive about cooperating
with militias and about letting former insurgents into the security forces.
These concerns were allayed in part by educational efforts pressed by a
few US officers. US troops supporting the Awakening educated coalition
forces on the intelligence and local knowledge defectors could offer.
American soldiers also emphasized the increasing alignment of interests
between Sunni fighters and the United States.54

Aligning Interests

Effectively using defectors as fighting forces requires the
counterinsurgency to recognize, and strengthen, aligned interests,
which need not be identical.55 Recognizing intersecting or overlapping
interests requires the counterinsurgency to prioritize its own goals. The
campaign in Dhofar and the early efforts in Iraq support this element,
while evidence from Algeria and a later period in Iraq show the costs of
not seeking or cementing aligned interests.
In Dhofar, the SAS leaders who formed the firqats around defectors
were bitterly disappointed that the units had to be structured around
tribal relationships when they had hoped for a pantribal force based on
their own liberal values. But the first-formed firqat had to be broken up
because of intertribal squabbling.56
Conversely, the effectiveness of the tribally based firqats was
exceptional precisely because of their tribal affiliations. Each unit
operated with their SAS handlers in their own tribal area, refused to
participate in any operation that did not directly benefit them, and refused
to cross tribal boundaries in the mountains, where the insurgency was
strongest. Their stubbornness infuriated the British officers leading the
Sultan’s campaign, but it paid off.57 The firqats influenced cousins and
brothers with the insurgency, when they considered it in their interest
to do so, and collected information from them.58 The firqats warned
52      Jeapes, SAS, 88.
53       Jeapes, interview; Perkins, interview; and MAJ Ian Gordon (former British officer who
served with SAF), interview with author, May 17, 2009. Thomas R. Mockaitis, makes a similar
point about the British imperial experience with non-European troops in British Counterinsurgency
in the Post-Imperial Era (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1995), 93. For more on
the SAS experience with unconventional warfare, see Walter C. Ladwig III, “Supporting Allies in
Counterinsurgency: Britain and the Dhofar Rebellion,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 19, no. 1 (March
2008): 62–88, doi:10.1080/09592310801905793.
54      Smith and MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens.”
55      Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security
9, no. 4 (Spring 1985): 3–43, doi:10.2307/2538540.
56      Jeapes, interview; and Perkins, interview.
57      Gardiner, Service of the Sultan, 157; and Perkins, interview.
58       Perkins, interview; Jeapes, SAS, 78; Akehurst catalog number 11156, reel 2, IWM; Jeapes,
interview; R. A. Lloyd Jones to A. A. Acland, July 1, 1971, DEFE 24/1835, TNA; D.F. Hawley,
October 16, 1972, DEFE 25/294, TNA; Sitrep, December 19, 1972, DEFE 25/368, TNA; Review of
the Military Situation Since the 10th December 1973 to the 23rd January 1974, Commander Sultan’s
Armed Forces MG Timothy Creasey, DEFE 25/312, TNA; The Principles Governing Military
Assistance to Oman, DEFE 25/315, TNA; Civil Administration in Dhofar, Oman, November 4,
1974, Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) 8/2216, TNA; and Report Commander Sultan’s
Armed Forces to Chiefs of Staff 28 December 1975, DEFE 11/899, TNA.
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their families that enemy activity near the outposts would mean no
more water in the harsh terrain.59 These outposts also made patrolling
deep into insurgent territory and expanding the network of tracks in the
mountains possible, which also increased military access to the region.60
The firqats safeguarded the interests of their friends and family as
well as their own. One day, mountain herders brought 1,400 goats to
an outpost. The firqats told their SAS handlers that they would not go
on any more operations if the military did not buy the goats. Dhofar’s
governor recognized a test when he heard one. He had the goats flown
down to the plain and purchased.61
In Dhofar, the firqats made sure their interests were known and
met in other ways as well. The firqats were paid regular wages, plus
bonuses for captured enemy weapons.62 Providing employment for and
feeding the families of fighting-age men made the firqats an expensive
insurance policy for the sultan that continued after the conflict in the
form of bounties for insurgents’ weapons and ammunition.63 Between
August 1974 and August 1976 alone, Sultan Qaboos bin Said paid out
nearly a million pounds.64 When the conflict was winding down, the
firqats feared for their livelihood. Their SAS handlers noticed that once
the firqats’ future was assured, the insurgents lurking in the valleys
faded away.65 The firqats were becoming warlords, but the government
remained stable. By conflict’s end, the firqat leaders controlled all
activity in their areas, including the grazing and watering of livestock
and the sale of state food, while staying busy conducting political affairs
in Dhofar’s capital city, Salalah, without challenging the sultan.66
In Anbar, when powerful Sunni tribes stopped fighting the United
States and allied with it against the new dominant local power, al-Qaeda,
then-Colonel Sean B. MacFarland put aside concerns about criminal
activity and potential fickleness on the part of the provinces’ political
leaders. He focused instead on getting what he needed from them as
intelligence sources and fighters. “You don’t get to be a sheik by being
a nice guy. These guys are ruthless characters,” MacFarland said. “That
doesn’t mean they can’t be reliable partners.”67
In Algeria, the French often used force and the threat of force,
including torture and threats against their families, to gain the cooperation
of defectors.68 The French suffered a major setback with Force K, a
Muslim Algerian guerrilla force. Force K turned out to consist largely
of insurgents and men who became insurgents after joining. Once the
deception was discovered, some 600 members of the 1,000-man force
escaped to the insurgency with their weapons and equipment.69
59       Akehurst, August, 13, 2004, catalog number 27184, reel 24, IMW.
60      Akehurst, We Won a War, 77–78.
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62      Jeapes, SAS, 59.
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64      Akehurst, We Won a War, 178.
65      Jeapes, interview.
66      Jeapes, SAS, 163.
67      John A. McCary, “The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives,” Washington Quarterly 32,
no. 1 (January 2009): 43–59, doi:10.1080/01636600802544905.
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In El Salvador, the counterinsurgency had success with its few
attempts to use defectors as fighters. This application may have been
limited because there was little alignment of interests between members
of the insurgency and the government. Many of the insurgents who
defected, including those who surrendered after increased combat
operations dislocated large numbers of civilians, did so out of war
weariness.70 In addition, many defectors were from areas with relatively
weak devotion to the insurgency.71
In Iraq, a key shared interest between the United States and the
sheiks of the Anbar Awakening, which had mixed success, was keeping
the tribal leaders alive. US forces supported and backed tribal operations
against al-Qaeda, and provided security for the sheiks and their families.
Further, the Americans acknowledged the status of the sheiks by
incorporating them into governance structures. When Sheikh Abdul
Sattar Bezia al-Rishawi of the Abu Risha tribe led a campaign against
al-Qaeda, the United States provided security for him, made him the
counterinsurgency coordinator for Anbar, deputized his militias, and
accepted his tribesmen into the Iraqi Police. Similarly, the tribesmen
of the Abu Mahal tribe came to dominate the Iraqi Army brigade in
their area.72
The costs to the counterinsurgency of not seeking to align some
interests with defectors and potential defectors can be high. In Iraq,
the danger of not finding a way to keep defectors’ interests aligned with
those of the government quickly became evident. The United States
initially paid salaries to Awakening members with the expectation that
the Iraqi government would take over in the longer term, providing jobs
that would keep the former insurgents aligned with the government.
After the US drawdown, this modus vivendi fractured. The Iraqi
government hired half or fewer of the fighters, and many of those hired
received menial work rather than positions in the security forces. A
number of defectors returned to fighting the government by aligning
with al-Qaeda, for pay, to avoid attack, or both. Nathum al-Jubouri, a
former Awakening Council leader in Salahuddin province, explained the
group’s uncertainty about “what the government intends for them.”73
Ultimately, a number of former insurgents and former defectors joined
forces with al-Qaeda’s successor organization, the Islamic State, and
have continued fighting the government and allied foreign forces.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This article has shown that counterinsurgencies get the most out of
using defectors as fighters when that use supports the fighters’ unique
skills and meets their interests.
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Counterinsurgency, Individual Study Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1985), 63,
67, Senior Officer Oral History Program, OCLC 24438418, US Army Heritage and Education
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In the successful campaigns in Dhofar, El Salvador, and Iraq,
counterinsurgents used defectors’ unique skills for operational success.
In Dhofar, the counterinsurgency also used the firqats for strategic
success. These warlords remain in power and contribute to Oman’s longterm political stability because the government continues to protect their
interests. In Dhofar and Iraq, counterinsurgents also gave defectors a
say in planning operations. In all three successes, defector units were
properly trained and supported and conventional forces cooperated with
them at the tactical and operational levels. In the two cases of failure,
there is limited evidence that counterinsurgents used defectors’ unique
skills, gave them a say, properly supported and cooperated with them,
and met their interests. Further research should determine not only more
about use of defectors in these cases but also examine additional cases.
These findings, while constrained by the limits of the information
available, suggest a counterinsurgency should prioritize its interests to
get the best out of defectors. Its need to defeat the insurgency should be
balanced with its desire to limit the creation of alternate power centers
within the state as well as any hope to retain the moral high ground by
refusing to cooperate with brutal actors. Further, the counterinsurgency
should make an effort to identify and to take advantage of strategically
overlapping interests, such as material rewards or status, with some of
those valued by insurgents.
The counterinsurgency should try to recognize when fissures develop
within the insurgency and seize those opportunities to create incentives
for partnership, rather than considering the insurgency as a unitary
actor with diametrically opposed interests to those of the government.
Counterinsurgents should recognize that insurgent leaders who can, and
will, bring their followers with them when they defect are more valuable
than individual defectors. The counterinsurgency should identify and
act upon ways to cement its alignment of interests with defectors in
the longer term as well as identify and use defectors’ most important
skills for the tasks at hand. This process includes bringing defectors’
knowledge and insights into the planning and targeting process and
using them in cooperation and coordination with conventional forces.
The counterinsurgency should apply the necessary resources to train,
equip, and support defectors properly, which includes assigning task
trainers, handlers, and leaders experienced in irregular warfare and with
non-Western fighters. Effective use of defectors as fighting forces is not
determinative in counterinsurgency, as far as this study can tell, but
it does provide governments and foreign forces with support in areas
where they are likely to be weakest.

